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Abstract
Very little has been written about the effect that oil prices have on manufacturing
output in the United States. This paper aims to shed light about the effect of oil prices, oil
imports, and GDP on U.S. manufacturing output through a four-variable vector
autoregression and explain the timing of these shocks through impulse response
functions. Empirical results find that oil prices are significant in determining
manufacturing output, but manufacturing output is also significant in determining oil
prices.
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I - Introduction
Oil prices are one of the most controversial topics of debate among economists
and politicians. Donald Trump said that oil was part of this country’s blood, and that high
oil prices would lead to loss of jobs.1 While it is still up for debate whether oil prices
have a statistically significant effect on GDP, this paper seeks to test the hypothesis that
oil prices have a statistically significant effect on manufacturing output. Manufacturing
output has been declining at a rapid rate in the U.S., and many politicians are quick to
blame high oil prices. Do these politicians have a point? The results were inconclusive.
Oil prices were statistically significant in projecting manufacturing output two periods
later while manufacturing output was statistically significant in projecting oil prices in the
next period. Furthermore, oil prices, GDP, and oil imports explain 75% of the variation in
manufacturing output over time, which leaves 25% to other factors. Section II will cover
some of the most influential literature on the subject of oil prices’ effect on GDP and
stock returns, section III will cover the data collected to run the model, section IV will go
over the two vector autoregressions used to illustrate the impact that oil prices have on oil
imports, GDP, and manufacturing output as well as the impulse response functions that
better illustrate how a shock to oil prices affects manufacturing output as well as how a
shock to manufacturing output affects oil prices, section V will go over the results of the
two vector autoregressions, section VI will go over the results of the impulse response
function, and section VII will conclude the paper with suggestions for further research.

1

Donald Trump, Time to Get Tough: Making America #1 Again (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Pub.,
2011) pg. 15-16.
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II – Relevant Journals
In terms of relevant literature, most literature collected data either at the full
macroeconomic level (quarterly GDP growth) or at the firm level with stock price
returns. First, this paper will focus on the relationship between stock returns and oil price
shocks. One of the most cited authors on oil prices and its effect on stock prices is Lutz
Kilian. In his most recent study (2009), Cheolbeom Park and he attempt to measure this
effect differently than Kilian had in the past. An interesting element of their study is that
they don’t treat oil as a purely exogenous commodity: “It has become widely accepted in
recent years that the price of crude oil since the 1970s has responded to some of the same
economic forces that drive stock prices, making it necessary to control for reverse
causality.”2 This simply means that it is uncertain whether oil prices are driving returns or
whether returns are driving oil prices. To test these constraints, they estimate a vector
autoregression with variables including the percent change in crude oil production, real
activity in global commodity markets, real price, and real stock returns3. They test out the
response by the market to shocks in pricing. They find that a price shock that follows a
positive demand shock for oil leads to sharp declines in stock market values for the most
part.4 Furthermore, not all the adjustment occurs on impact; there is some longer term
smoothing out. In the case where there are precautionary shocks to demand, there is a
negative and statistically significant market return that peaks about a month after the
shock.5 Kilian and Park also take a specific look at the automobile industry, where oil is a

2
Lutz Kilian and Cheolbeom Park, “The Impact of Oil Price Shocks on the U.S. Stock Market,”
International Economic Review 50, no. 4 (2009):, doi:10.1111/j.1468-2354.2009.00568.x.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid.
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significant input in both the operating and manufacturing aspects. Kilian and Park
discover that there is a certain decrease in returns for automobile companies only during
an oil specific demand shock. A general aggregate demand shock, by contrast, has an
uncertain effect on returns.6 Their overall finding is that in all areas, only an oil specific
demand shock causes any sort of certain change to returns.7
Jungwook Park and Ronald A. Ratti also look at the effects of oil price shocks on
the stock market; however, they look at European countries in addition to the U.S. This
way, they can see if shocks have a country by country effect or a whole scale effect. 8
They use a VAR consisting of oil prices, real stock returns in the U.S. and 13 European
countries, short-term interest rates, consumer prices, and industrial production. All
variables are first-differenced in order to prevent serial correlation. An interesting caveat
to their regression model is that they use world oil price instead of national price.9While
there are not huge regional differences, not all countries have identical oil policies. Thus,
this should increase the significance of oil price shocks to returns on the stock market, as
all subsidies and other fiscal factors are removed from the equation. By using world
prices, Park and Ratti also can illustrate that oil price shocks have the same statistical
significance in the U.S. as they do across Europe. If they do, then the effect of an oil
shock of any sort in the U.S. might also have some endogenous trade effect with Europe.
Nicholas Apergis and Stephen M. Miller took the research done by Kilian and
Park and combined it with the research done by Park and Ratti to run their own study of

6

Ibid.
Ibid.
8
Jungwook Park and Ronald A. Ratti, “Oil Price Shocks and Stock Markets in the U.S. and 13
European Countries,” Energy Economics 30, no. 5 (2008): , doi:10.1016/j.eneco.2008.04.003.
9
Ibid.
7
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the effect of structural oil-market shocks on stock market returns in the U.S. and seven
other countries.10 They take the VAR that Kilian used and modify it to only include three
vector shocks: oil-supply shocks, global-oil demand shocks, and global-aggregate
demand shocks11. The rationale for including only these three shocks is that they are
completely exogenous of each other, which allows for much more significant results. For
their data, they use monthly data from the CPI, an index of freight rates, oil prices per
barrel in U.S. dollars, barrels pumped per day, and stock market price. They didn’t
include oil imports because imports might have an endogeneity issue with CPI and
freight rates which are included already in the regression. The eight countries they choose
are the U.S., UK, Japan, Germany, Italy, Australia, Canada, and France.12 Of note is that
from 1981-2007 (the time that the article covers), all the above-mentioned countries were
net oil importers. Their findings were that the idiosyncratic demand shock, or global oil
demand shock, was strongly statistically significant, the other two shocks were
significant in some of the countries but not all, and, most importantly, the magnitude of
the effect of all these shocks was very small.13
These findings lead to an interesting question: is oil output driving stock returns?
Returns can come from a multitude of different policies, such as changes in the interest
rate, changes in the consumer base, and changes in the political system to name a few.
Especially within the automotive industry, oil price shocks could be offset by reducing
costs of labor, rent, etc. Another question also arises from these papers: oil price shocks

10
Nicholas Apergis and Stephen M. Miller, “Do Structural Oil-market Shocks Affect Stock
Prices?” Energy Economics 31, no. 4 (2009):, doi:10.1016/j.eneco.2009.03.001.
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.
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clearly have a significant effect on market returns, but do oil price shocks actually affect
GDP? Furthermore, is the short-term effect on the market based on actual data insights or
on animal spirits caused by the shock? If the latter is true, then these papers are of no help
in determining whether oil price shocks and volatility have any significance in the decline
of manufacturing in the U.S.
Furthermore, when looking at the relationship between oil prices and stock
returns, it appears that specific oil demand shocks are the most important and significant
shocks. Is the same true when oil prices are compared to national GDP?
Mark Hooker focused on the relationship between oil prices and the U.S.
macroeconomy. Specifically, he looked at supply side shocks caused by OPEC in 1973
and 1979 to see how much of an impact the shocks had on changes in GDP. Hooker
chooses those points because from 1973-1979, the OPEC cartel had almost full power
over the price of oil.14 First, he examines the causal relationship of oil prices on GDP. In
the most recent subsample of 1973-1994, oil price was not a statistically significant factor
in determining GDP.15 Furthermore, the coefficients in the 1973-1994 subsample were
smaller than those in the 1948-1973 subsample. This is contrary to the theory that larger
oil shocks should lead to a more drastic change in GDP. Secondly, Hooker then
specifically attempts to measure two major oil shocks: OPEC I, which happened in 1973
after the Yom Kippur War, and OPEC II, which happened shortly after the fall of the
Shah in Iran. Using a VAR, Hooker finds that the 1973 OPEC I shock was not significant

Mark A. Hooker, “What Happened to the Oil Price-Macroeconomy Relationship?” Journal of
Monetary Economics 38, no. 2 (1996):, doi:10,1016/s0304-3932(96)01281-0.
15
Ibid.
14
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in creating the recession that would later follow.16 However, OPEC II had some
significance in capturing the recession that followed, but it did not create a complete
picture of the recession. Rather, other endogenous and domestic factors had much greater
statistical significance.
One interesting factor of Hooker’s paper is that it doesn’t overtly consider the
different political trends occurring in the United States starting in the 1970s. By 1973, the
U.S. had fully escalated the Vietnam War into neighboring Cambodia. Large increases in
government spending coupled with constant tax rates could have helped create the large
inflationary period. In addition, the 1980s featured a decade-long war between Iraq and
Iran. The war almost completely crippled the ability of either nation to produce oil, and
thus forced the U.S. to look elsewhere for substitutes. Finally, this paper does not address
the changes made in car manufacturing in the 1980s. Chevrolet and Ford specifically
began to make much more fuel-efficient cars; thus, consumption of oil was much smaller
during the period.
Evangelia Papapetrou looks at oil prices and their effect on employment in
Greece. Papapetrou uses a multivariable VAR to analyze the effects in addition to an
impulse response function featuring four different types of shocks: interest rate shocks,
real oil prices shocks, industrial production shocks, and real stock returns shocks. For
Greece, it appears that oil prices have a significant effect on employment, output growth,
and industrial production and employment.17 Furthermore, just like in the stock market
returns example used by Park and Kilian, Papapetrou’s results show increased amount of

16

Ibid.
Evangelia Papapetrou, “Oil Price Shocks, Stock Market, Economic Activity and Employment in
Greece,” Energy Economics 23, no. 5 (2001): , doi:10.1016/s0140-9883(01)00078-0.
17
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variance controlled for as the shock wears on. While oil prices are proven to have
significant effects to stock market returns18, it is uncertain how much of an impact these
oil shocks have on pure manufacturing. Greece’s GDP from construction and mining
were near all-time lows in 2001, and thus this country might not be the best example of
how an oil shock affects manufacturing of all sorts in the United States.
James D. Hamilton attempts to link oil prices to the U.S. macroeconomy through
a different function. Instead of using a VAR, he uses one nonlinear time series to
calculate the effect of oil prices on U.S. GDP.19 By not running a VAR, Hamilton doesn’t
believe that there are any feedbacks, thus, GDP has no effect on oil prices in his model.
This method is counter to what Park and Ratti (2008) did in their paper on oil prices and
market shocks. This also suggests that stock markets could have a more linear
relationship than GDP does with oil. Hamilton’s first step is to reject the null hypothesis
that the relationship between oil and GDP growth is linear. Using a Chi-squared test, he
gets a value of 40.00, which overwhelmingly allows him to reject the null.20 Furthermore,
his nonlinear time series is very stable at all elements. One interesting note on this paper
is that the five major oil price shocks post-World War II and pre-Iraqi Conflict were all in
response to war in the Middle East. These shocks are all exogenous shocks, and because
of that, these shocks were responsible for all of the price change.21 Based on Hamilton’s
analysis, it can be argued that oil shocks have a strong indirect effect on GDP, and most
of all, it appears that the oil price shocks are exogenously caused by Middle East conflict.

18

Ibid.
James D. Hamilton, “What Is an Oil Shock?,” Journal of Econometrics 113, no. 2 (2003):, doi:
10.1016/s0304-4076(02)00207-5.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
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This conflict has historically led the U.S. into recession. Hamilton does not segment GDP
by sector or industry either, which leaves room for the question of how do oil prices
affect the manufacturing sector? Furthermore, are oil intensive industries truly hit harder
by positive oil price shocks?
One of the few articles to use industry level data is one written by Kiseok Lee and
Shawn Ni. They use input/output (hereon to be referred to as I/O) tables first to show in
which industries petroleum is most used. They discover that the transportation industry is
the largest user of petroleum, but they also find that transportation, industrial
manufacturing, and residential/commercial manufacturing make up only one-third of the
total consumption of petroleum.22 To calculate the impact of oil on both oil intensive and
oil lacking industries, they first use a VAR with both aggregate data and industry-level
data.23 The idea behind this is that once the causal effects of the variables are estimated,
Lee and Ni can then run individual regressions on the separate industries. This should
lead to more exogenous results and statistically significant variables. Looking at the
impulse response functions, oil-intensive industries respond to oil price shocks with
industry supply shocks. However, price is affected much more than quantity produced24,
which means that the supply curve must be relatively inelastic. For non-intensive oil
industries, an oil price shock leads to a shift in both the quantity supplied and the price.
The shock therefore has an increased effect on the demand curve25, and due to the

22
Kiseok Lee and Shawn Ni, “On the Dynamic Effects of Oil Price Shocks: A Study Using
Industry Level Data,” Journal of Monetary Economics 49, no. 4 (2002):, doi:10.1016/s03043932(02)00114-9.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid.
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elasticity of this curve the peak response to the shock is very large. This makes sense that
the shock would be on the demand curve because even though oil is not a significant
input in the manufacturing of the car, it is a highly important input in operation of the car.
One thing that Lee and Ni did not cover was the effect of oil price shocks on pure
manufacturing. In the following section, the link between oil price shocks and the
manufacturing sector will be clarified as well as the link between oil price shocks and
industry output using thirteen extra years of data.

III – Data Review
The data that we are using are wide and varied. The first data set has quarterly
manufacturing output index data at the sector level from FRED, 26and a weighted average
quarterly oil price from the Energy Information Administration (EIA).27Because the raw
data is in the form of monthly prices, the prices were converted into quarterly averages.
Most of the cited studies used quarterly data in creating their models. The Energy
Information Administration (EIA) provided monthly data on U.S. oil imports28 and were
converted to quarterly imports through aggregation of total imports of each month in the
quarter. Finally, the U.S. quarterly GDP also comes from FRED.29
The data covers 115 quarterly periods from 3rd quarter of 1987 up to the 2nd
quarter of 2016. This includes the 1990 Persian Gulf War, the attacks of September 11,
2001, the invasion of Iraq and the five-year Iraqi conflict, and the beginning of the U.S.’

“Manufacturing Sector: Real Output,” FRED, accessed October 21, 2016,
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/OUTMS.
27
“U.S. Crude Oil First Purchase Price,” U.S. Energy Information Administration,
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=f000000_3&f=m.
28
“Data 1: U.S. Imports of Crude Oil (Thousand Barrels),”U.S. Energy Information
Administration, http://tonto.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MCRIMU.S.1&f=M.
29
“Gross Domestic Product”, FRED, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDP
26
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return to oil exporter. Of important note is that the manufacturing output data at the sector
level does not exist in the form of gross output. Therefore, the raw data is both at an
index and as a percent change.
Industry data is provided by FRED only at the yearly level. Due to the yearly
nature of the data and the fact that a yearly weighted average oil price is not a fair
representation of a price shock, this data will not be used in the VAR regression.

IV-Explanation of Models
We estimate the effect of oil prices on manufacturing output using two different
VARs: a 3-variable VAR consisting of GDP, oil imports, and oil prices with a lag length
of five quarters and a 4-variable VAR consisting of GDP, oil imports, oil prices, and
manufacturing output with a lag length of four quarters. The reason for using different lag
lengths is that the Akaike information criterion, or AIC, was minimized with different
length lags in the 3-variable and 4-variable VARs. A VAR can best be described as time
series for multiple different variables. This first model does not include manufacturing
data because it is important to determine first how oil prices affect the largest scale parts
of the economy. If oil prices are found to have no statistically significant effect on GDP
but are found to have a significant effect on manufacturing output, then it can be said that
manufacturing does not have a statistically significant effect on GDP. There are two
possible interpretations to this data. One is that oil prices can be ignored when evaluating
a country’s health. While this seems to be a reasonable conclusion, it is far too simplistic.
The more likely scenario is that oil impacts other parts of the economy such as the
drilling, extraction, and refining segments in a way that offsets the effect that prices have

15

on manufacturing. The second VAR will include manufacturing output as an index. This
makes it a log variable, as it is measured in percent changes.

The standard one variable VAR model with n-lags can be written the following
way:
yt = α + β1yt-1 + β2yt-2 + … + βnyt-n + et
For the first model, there are three variables so Yt will be a three-variable vector.
Something very important to consider is the ordering of integration of the variables, as
inconsistency could lead to issues with the model as time lags and as the variables are
differentiated. For the first VAR, y will contain oil imports, U.S. GDP, and oil prices. Of
note is that each variable has been stationarized by taking the first difference, which can
be written as yt-yt-1. As mentioned before, stationarizing variables is essential to avoiding
serial correlation. This makes the R2 much more accurate in determining how much of the
variance has actually been accounted for. Each variable has its own equation; to make the
full VAR, each of the one to one models are added together to form a matrix. Before the
VAR is to be run, the variables will be Cholesky ordered by the speed of change. This
guarantees more stable coefficients as well as more statistically significant coefficients.
The second model is very similar to the first but manufacturing output is included as y4 to
each of the three equations. Manufacturing output also gets its own equation.
The next part of the model involves impulse response functions. I have calculated
six orthogonalized impulse response functions; the first three measure the effect of
independent and isolated shocks to GDP, oil prices, and oil imports on manufacturing
output, and the second three measure the effect of a manufacturing output shock on GDP,
16

oil prices, and oil imports. The reason for measuring the shocks both ways is that all four
of the variables are endogenous variables. Endogeneity simply means that two variables
have impact on each other. For instance, if the equation for variable y is yi = xi + zi while
the equation for variable z is zi = xi + yi. Because y is needed to calculate z and z is
needed to calculate y, there is endogeneity. A VAR allows for easier understanding of if
there is a feedback loop between two variables, which is important if only one of the
equations is important. If all we care about is projecting oil prices, and GDP is
statistically significant in determining oil prices but oil prices are also statistically
significant in determining GDP, then there is uncertainty about the validity of oil prices
as a metric. This creates a nuisance in the calculation of future oil prices. The standard
formula for an impulse response is the following where y is a state vector and e is a
vector of shocks for n periods:
yt = Anyt-n+An-1et-(n-1)+…+et
For the impulse response functions, I have calculated a horizon of 40 periods into the
future. This means that I will be able to show the effect of a singular shock over 10 years
of time. This should leave enough time for the shock to wear off and for yt to return to
zero.

17

V – Results of VAR
The results of the first VAR are listed below.
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Oil imports had the largest R2 of the three equations in the vector at 60%,
meaning that oil prices are better explained by this 3 variable VAR than the other
endogenous variables in the model. Oil price did not have a statistically significant effect
on the quantity of barrels imported while GDP of the previous two quarters had a
significant effect on the quantity of barrels imported. The coefficients for the two
significant GDP period lags were both 80. Thus, if quarterly GDP increased by $100B,
80,000 more barrels would be imported in each of the next two periods.
For price per barrel, only 25% of the variance was explained by previous price,
imports, and GDP. The fact that price per barrel explains imports more than imports
explain price makes sense, as the U.S. is not the only nation to import oil. The fact that
20

U.SS. imports have any effect on oil pricing shows that the U.S. is a relatively large part
(but not 100%) of global demand. Oil imports from a lag of three quarters had a
significant effect on price; however, the coefficient was almost zero. Price also had some
autocorrelation with a one period lag; thus, in this model, the best predictor of oil price
change was the previous quarter’s price change.
For GDP, only 34% of the variance was explained by previous GDP, price, and
imports. This makes intuitive sense, as oil price and oil imports make up a very small part
of the expenditures model of GDP. Furthermore, neither oil imports nor price are
statistically significant in determining changes in GDP. GDP has autocorrelation, which
means that the change in GDP will be positive if the previous period’s change in GDP is
positive.
For the most part, the 3-variable VAR shows that the first difference in GDP from
the previous period has statistical significance when projecting oil price, the first
difference from the previous two periods is significant in projecting imports, and that all
the variables have some sort of autocorrelation with the previous period.
When manufacturing is added to the VAR, the R2 for price and GDP jumps by
almost 20%. In addition, the R2 for the index change in manufacturing output is almost
75%, which implies that its VAR explains more of oil prices than any of the other
endogenous variables. The AIC increases, but the overall significance of the model
increases due to the addition of the manufacturing output.

21
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For imports, the price of a barrel of oil is statistically significant at the 90%
confidence level and negative. If the price of a barrel of oil goes up by $10.00 in the
current quarter, oil imports will decrease by 7.85 million barrels in the next quarter. This
is a huge change at almost double the median change in imports. Fortunately, the median
change in price was $0.66/barrel, thus the large change in imports would almost certainly
be reversed in the following quarters. Changes in GDP lagged three periods have a
significant effect on the quantity of barrels imported; however, the coefficient is negative.
An increase in GDP will cause a decrease in oil imports three quarters later. This does not
make intuitive sense, as one would expect oil imports to increase as income increased.
But this rise in GDP could also be independent of manufacturing; a rise in oil production
or a rise in oil-lacking services could easily cause national income to increase without
24

having any effect on oil imports. This effect could be due to possible increased purchase
of American oil with increased budgets or an increased purchase in cheaper, foreign oil if
national income decreases. Imports are also negatively autocorrelated from the previous
period. There could be some federal policy behind this, but if the number of barrels
imported in the period is greater than the number of barrels imported in the previous
period, it can be expected that the number of barrels imported next period will be smaller
than the number of barrels imported in the current period.
For price, imports lagged by one period are also statistically significant at the 90%
confidence level. Thus, there is endogeneity between barrels imported and oil prices, as
both variables are significant in calculating the future price of the other. However, the
coefficient for the oil imports lagged by one period is almost zero. An increase of 10,000
imported barrels of oil would increase the price per barrel by less than one cent. Price is
also positively autocorrelated with its previous period price. Thus, past price change is a
good predictor of present price change. Of most interesting note is that now a one period
lag of GDP and manufacturing output is significant at the 99.9% confidence level while a
three-period lag for both GDP and manufacturing is significant at the 99% level. The
coefficient for GDP lagged one period is both negative and large. A $100B increase in
GDP will lower the price of oil by almost $6 a barrel next quarter. However, the
coefficient for GDP lagged three periods has a slightly lower value, but with a flipped
sign. The reason that three period lagged GDP and current period oil prices have
matching signs could be due to other economic changes. Three periods could be enough
for suppliers to increase their price for the wealthier client. For manufacturing output, the
same can be said, except that a one period lag has a positive sign whereas a three-period
25

lag has a negative sign. If manufacturing output increases by 1%, the price of oil the next
quarter increases by $3.36. This might not be enough time to truly view what happens
with output, however, as if manufacturing output increases by 1%, the price of oil three
quarters later will have fallen by $3.16. This is a marginal change, and after three
quarters, the effect of an output shock will have been reversed. The impulse response
function showing the change in price per barrel following an oil shock graphically shows
this change. The reason for this change could be that if manufacturing output increases,
immediately oil supplying nations will charge a higher price, as their customers might be
more willing to pay, but as time increases, manufacturing output could begin to slow
from the higher oil prices, and thus suppliers will lower their prices to the now poorer
customer.
GDP has a much interesting outcome from this model. Oil price does not have a
statistically significant relationship with GDP. Thus, it is safe to reject the argument that
oil prices affect GDP. GDP also is not autocorrelated with lags of one quarter and two
quarters, but has a statistically significant relationship with manufacturing output lagged
one period and three periods. The signs on the correlation coefficients here also flip
between the 3 period lag and the one period lag. If manufacturing output increases by
1%, GDP first increases by $31B, adjusts, and then, assuming no changes to output,
decreases by $28.7B. The reason for this is simple: if firms immediately increase output,
investment increases and GDP increases. However, a purchase of a manufactured good is
not a regular purchase, thus less is purchased and GDP falls back closer to its original
level.

26

Finally, there are significant results for the most interesting equation in the vector:
manufacturing output. Manufacturing output is highly autocorrelated with the output
from the previous period and changes at almost a 1 to 1 ratio. Oil imports have no
significant effect on manufacturing output. This makes complete sense as a country that
wants to build infrastructure or goods will import oil, but a positive shock to oil imports
might not necessarily change manufacturing output. GDP also has no statistically
significant effect on manufacturing output, which means that there is also no endogeneity
between GDP and manufacturing output. This is odd, in that these results show an
elasticity of demand for domestic manufacturing goods to be approximately zero. But
most interestingly, oil prices lagged two quarters are statistically significant at the 99.9%
confidence level. If the price of oil goes up by $10 a barrel, manufacturing output two
quarters later will fall by 0.5%. 0.5% is not a significant decrease for national income, as
a 0.5% decrease in output leads to a $15B decrease in GDP the quarter after (by contrast,
quarterly GDP changed usually by an absolute value close to $100B each quarter). But a
0.5% decrease does lead to a loss of jobs in the sector itself, so while the whole country
might be unaffected, the manufacturers are not. Especially in manufacturing industries
that are more oil intensive, the effect on job loss could be much heavier. Based on this, it
is safe to say that oil prices significantly affect manufacturing output, just not
immediately. Because manufacturing output is also statistically significant when
calculating oil prices, there is a feedback loop between the two variables. This means the
two variables are endogenous, and thus it is almost impossible to figure out which
variable has a stronger impact on the other.

27

VI – Results of IRF
The impulse response functions can best show the effect of how a shock on one
variable impacts a different variable over time. First, we will look at the effects that a
shock to manufacturing output had on oil prices.

A manufacturing shock has an almost immediate positive effect on the price per
barrel of oil; however, there is a negative shock of almost the exact same size as the
original shock shortly after. The small decrease after the first quarter shock is caused by
the endogeneity of the two variables. An increased price has a negative effect on
manufacturing output in the second quarter, and that outweighs the insignificant positive
effect that increased output has on oil prices for the quarter. By 10 quarters (2.5 years) the

28

effect of the shock has completely worn off and output holds constant until the next
shock.

An oil price shock has a strong and immediate influence on manufacturing output.
The graph for the oil price shock is much smoother than that of the manufacturing output
shock. Even so, the magnitude of the price shock is almost identical to the magnitude of
the manufacturing output shock. Therefore, due to the endogeneity issue mentioned
above, it is very difficult to tell which effect is stronger: manufacturing output on oil
price or oil price on manufacturing output.
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VII - Conclusion
In conclusion, we find that manufacturing output has a statistically significant
effect on oil prices; however, we also find that oil prices have a statistically significant
effect on manufacturing output. This feedback loop creates problems, as it is harder to
isolate what sectors oil prices are truly important and exogenous in. Possible future
studies include finding quarterly industry data to calculate the effect oil prices have on
certain industries, or possibly breaking apart the manufacturing sector into oil intensive
industries and oil lacking industries to see if oil prices and the two separate sectors still
have a feedback loop. To figure out what variables are exogenous with manufacturing
output, certain state policies could be examined along with the political parties in control
of state legislatures. Other commodity prices such as steel could also be included to see if
they have any exogenous effect on manufacturing prices. Still the point remains: it is
known that oil prices are significant in determining future manufacturing output, and it is
known that manufacturing output is significant in determining future oil output.
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